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THE NEW GOLD RUSH: THE LAST FRONTIER OF
THE SECURITIES LAWS?*
I. INTRODUCTION
State and federal securities laws are designed to protect prospec-
tive investors against fraud. The laws accomplish this by requiring
complete disclosure of information and providing for civil and crimi-
nal penalties in cases of fraud or noncompliance.' In order for the
securities laws to apply, however, a transaction must first be defined
as a security.' Much securities caselaw is therefore devoted to deter-
© 1989 by Richard S. Hardy
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1. The Securities Act of 1933 (current version 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(k), (1), (q) (1982)); The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (current version 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982)); CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 25000-25600 (Deering 1979).
2. Both state and federal securities laws contain sections defining securities. For exam-
ple, The Securities Act of 1933 section 2 contains the principle definition:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate
or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, . . . or in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, tempo-
rary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b (1982) (emphasis added).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 section 3(a) gives a slightly different definition:
When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:
(10) the term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement
or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certifi-
cate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, . . . or in
general, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not
include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance
which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months,
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is like-
wise limited.
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mining the types of transactions properly characterized as securities.
This determination is important to both investors seeking protection
from investment swindles and promoters seeking to raise capital
through the use of investments.
Historically, courts have been willing to broadly interpret some
of the more vague statutory terms defining securities in order to keep
pace with an increasingly complex financial world.' The most useful
of these terms found in both federal and state securities statutes has
been the term "investment contract."" This term has been used by
the courts as a catch-all definition, reaching transactions that cannot
traditionally be characterized as a security. Thus the cutting edge of
securities law is based on cases dedicated to deciding whether the
transaction in question is an investment contract and hence a secur-
ity to which both federal and state securities laws apply.5
A short hypothetical will illustrate the type of transaction nor-
mally involving the securities laws. Suppose that X owns a gold
mine but has no processing or refining capabilities. The ore must be
shipped elsewhere to be processed and refined in order to yield mar-
ketable gold. Since it usually takes several tons of ore to produce a
few ounces of gold, the cost efficiency of transporting the ore to a
refining plant is quite low. Most mining operations, therefore, pro-
cess and refine their ore "on site." Suppose further that X has stock-
piles of dump ore,6 but has no profitable method for refining it. X
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
The California securities law is similar to the federal:
"Security" means any note; stock; treasury stock; membership in an incorpo-
rated or unincorporated association; bond; debenture; evidence of indebtedness;
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement; collateral
trust certificate; preorganization certificate or subscription; transferable share;
investment contract; voting trust certificate; certificate of deposit for a security;
certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas or mining title or lease or in
payments out of production under such a title or lease; put, call straddle, option,
or privilege on any security ....
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (Deering Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
3. See, e.g., SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (citrus groves); SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.) (self-improvement seminars), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga.
1973) (cosmetic sales), rev'd and remanded, 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974). See infra notes 37-
44, 58-60 and accompanying text.
4. See supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., SEC v. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 94,142
at 94,604 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); In re Worm World, Inc., 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 71,414
(S.D. Dept. of Commerce and Consumer Affairs 1978).
6. Dump ore is a term of art in mining that refers to ore, which has already been
processed. The ore still contains a small concentration of the desired mineral. Extraction of the
mineral after processing is difficult and expensive. Moreland v. Dept. of Corporations, 194
[Vol. 29
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also wishes to build the necessary refinery plant to increase overall
profit. How may X raise the necessary capital?'
Under current law, X may sell the dump ore directly to the
public, thus raising the capital necessary for construction of the new
facilities without being subject to the regulatory provision of the se-
curities laws.8 X can set a price for the ore above the cost of mining,
but well below the market price of refined gold, and realize profit on
the difference between the cost of mining the ore and its sale price.
Prospective buyers will anticipate a profit only if they can sell the
gold after at a market price higher than the cost of purchasing the
ore plus the cost of processing it. Using this approach, the mining
company can raise enough capital to satisfy its goal of expanding its
operations. All the promoter need do to induce buyer interest is to
guarantee a minimum gold content in the ore.
In two recent cases, SEC v. Belmont Reid & Co.9 and More-
land v. Department of Corporations,"0 both federal and California
courts have held that the direct sale of a commodity under facts simi-
lar to the hypothetical above is not a sale of a security and is there-
fore outside the purview of the securities laws. These cases mark a
new trend toward slowing the expansion of securities regulation by
limiting the scope of the term investment contract. There is also a
developing inconsistency among the courts in defining the proper role
of securities law.
Prior to these decisions, the growth of this area of law was un-
impeded and showed a concern for the practical reality of each trans-
action." In the above hypothetical X can raise money quickly and
Cal. App. 3d 506, 239 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1987).
7. The traditional means of raising capital, such as stock offerings, debt instruments,
and partnership interests are effective but expensive expenditures of time and money. The
offeror must relinquish some ownership interest in the venture or go into debt obtaining the
capital. Both options generally necessitate expensive legal assistance. Additionally, in some
cases, review by an appropriate state or federal regulatory agency is required. From a mine
owner's perspective, the traditional methods of raising capital may be prohibitive due to cost
and inconvenience. GERALD ROBINSON, GOING PUBLIC, 8-10 (SECURITIES LAW SERIES, VOL.
1, 1978).
8. SEC v. Belmont Reid & Co., 794 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1986) (sale of gold coins on a
prepayment basis from defendant's mining operation). See infra notes 137-43 and accompany-
ing text. Moreland v. Department of Corps., 194 Cal. App. 3d 506, 239 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1987)
(sale of gold ore to the public not a security). See infra notes 113-14 and 144.
9. 794 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1986). See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
10. 194 Cal. App. 3d at 506, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 558. See infra note 118-20 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Moreland.
11. See generally SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 758 F.2d 459 (9th
Cir. 1985); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
1989]
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inexpensively, while remaining outside the scope of the securities
laws under the Belmont Reid and Moreland decisions. This ap-
proach has serious shortcomings. Problems arise since the public
seeking to buy the ore must rely solely on the owner's representa-
tions about its value. This occurs in nearly every investment oppor-
tunity. Since these representations are made to a relatively unsophis-
ticated investing public, the potential for fraud is extreme.
Unfortunately, the courts that until recently have demonstrated a
willingness to broadly construe the securities laws for the protection
of the public have begun to refuse to extend the protection of securi-
ties law to these situations.
This comment examines the current definition of investment
contract in determining the applicability of the securities law in the
context of financing gold production. Precious metals have tradition-
ally been a popular investment in financially uncertain times. As the
price of gold rises along with inflation, there has been a revival in
gold investments, ranging from mining stock to coins. 12 Along with
the heightened public interest in such investments comes the usual
assortment of get rich quick schemes. As the law now stands, selling
any form of interest in future profits of a mine will fit easily under
the current definition of investment contract.1 Difficulties arise
when the mining company sells assets or the raw commodity itself to
the public. Recent cases suggest that a direct sale of an underlying
commodity lies outside both federal and state securities law. 4 This
general rule means that a producer of a commodity may raise capital
by selling the mined raw material directly to a buyer.1 5 In the case
of a gold mine, unrefined ore may be sold at a fair margin over cost,
but still well below the spot market price for processed gold. 6
U.S. 821 (1973); SEC v. International Mining Exch., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1062 (D. Colo.
1981). See infra notes 49-68 and accompanying text for discussion pertaining to the historical
expansion of the Howey test.
12. See Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1987, at 34, col. 1. Gold production and price have in-
creased as demand increases.
13. Both state and federal securities laws expressly provide for coverage of interests in
mineral rights. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(10) (1982); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 25019 (Deerings 1979). Any agreement to share in anticipated profits also meets the
Howey investment contract test. See, e.g., Goldfield, 758 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1985). See infra
notes 37-44 for discussion of the Howey test.
14. SEC v. Belmont Reid & Co., 794 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1986); Moreland, 194 Cal.
App. 3d 506, 239 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1987). See generally T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION (1985).
15. Since a direct sale is a commercial transaction, the securities laws are unnecessary.
However, in cases where the promoter solicits capital in exchange for goods plus a future
promise to perform, the securities laws should apply. HAZEN, supra note 14, at 20.
16. Moreland, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 506, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 558. While an investor may
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Straight commercial transactions are, and should be, outside the
scope of the securities laws. However, some transactions contain both
commercial and investment qualities. It has been the latter area into
which the definition of investment contract has traditionally been
expanded.
This comment will first examine the federal securities statutes
and the test developed in SEC v. W. J. Howey & Co.17 to show how
the courts have developed an expanding definition of "investment
contract" over the last fifty years. It will then turn to California's
securities law and attempts to apply the Howey test to enforce the
state statutes. These efforts have culminated in the formulation of
the "risk capital" test, which has since been adopted by a growing
number of states.1 8 A reading of the background of the laws and the
decisions interpreting the state statutes will clearly illustrate how the
term investment contract has been fashioned to cover transactions
with investment characteristics. Until recently, courts have attempted
to effectuate the spirit and policy of the securities laws by examining
the investment market and determining whether investor protection
is needed.
Finally, this comment proposes that courts return to a con-
stantly expanding definition of investment contract, while approach-
ing each case from a firm public policy standpoint (i.e., is there suffi-
cient danger to warrant investor protection?). Since no legislative
effort could satisfactorily encompass the myriad of factual situations
in which investor protection is needed, the best solution is for the
courts to approach the definition of securities pragmatically. This
method requires courts to find whether or not investment character-
istics exist in a transaction and to apply investment contract analysis
when these characteristics are found. In this way, there will be suffi-
cient flexibility for the courts to exclude situations in which applica-
tion of the securities laws would hinder investment more than would
be eager to enter into what appears to be a profitable investment, costs of transporting, refin-
ing, and marketing the purchased ore could eventually result in a substantial loss.
17. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
18. California and Hawaii have adopted a judicial risk capital test. See Silver Hills
Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961); State v.
Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971). Alaska, Georgia, Michigan,
Oklahoma, and Washington have adopted a statutory risk capital test. See ALASKA STAT. §
45.55.130(12) (1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2 (1988); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 451.801(2)
(1978); OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20) (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.005(12)
(1979). See also Carney & Fraser, Defining A "Security": Georgia's Struggle with the "Risk
Capital" Test, 14 SEc. L. REv. 503 (1980).
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promote it. 9 It is therefore up to the courts to overturn prior deci-
sions that have confused the law and approach investment contract
cases from the perspective of the investor's need for information and
the possibility of fraud. In order to effectuate this result, it is sug-
gested that California courts adopt the combined Howey-risk capital
test stated in State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.2"
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Securities Statutes
Congress passed the 1933 Securities Act 2 ' and the 1934 Securi-
ties Exchange Act 22 to remedy the popular notion that the financial
markets caused the Great Depression.2 3 It was thought that the indi-
vidual investor needed government protection from fraudulent invest-
ment schemes.24 Public confidence in the financial markets was sig-
nificantly eroded by the "wild speculation" resulting from worthless
and fraudulent schemes and it was thought that by encouraging in-
vestment, the Depression would end more quickly. 5 Congress there-
fore passed laws requiring public registration and disclosure of infor-
mation for all securities issued to the public.26 This placed the
potential investor in a stronger bargaining position versus the issuer
and provided a clear legal remedy for fraud.27 Enforcing the policy
aim of these laws, the United States Supreme Court stated, "[The
purpose was] to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the phi-
losophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of bus-
19. Securities laws would be unnecessarily burdensome if applied to commercial trans-
actions. In addition to being costly and time-consuming, the disclosure requirements would
prevent many transactions. However, securities law does attempt to balance the competing
interest between the necessity of investor protection and the difficulty in adhering to statutory
terms.
20. 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (Haw. 1971).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1982).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
23. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933); See generally T. HAZEN, supra
note 14.
24. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933).
25. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) ("The aim is to prevent further ex-
ploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through
misrepresentation ... to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation,
against the competition afforded by dishonest securities ....").
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
27. Legal redress for securities misrepresentation is generally provided for in 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77k, 1, q (1982) and in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, n, p, r (1982). A more complete compilation may
be found in Chang, Meaning, Reference and Reification in the Definition of a Security, 19
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 403. See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION (1983).
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iness ethics in the securities industry."2 Thus the securities laws
sought to protect the investor from the dangers of investing without
complete and accurate information. To effectuate this policy, Con-
gress provided, inter alia, a comprehensive definition of a security in
both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act.
Both statutes provide slightly different definitions of a secur-
ity. 9 The United States Supreme Court decided, however, that both
definitions are to be construed as "virtually identical." s° Since the
Acts are remedial legislative efforts, courts must construe them
broadly, emphasizing the substance over the form of the transac-
tion.8 Though the definitions are quite detailed, courts have used
them primarily as guidelines and have not limited construction of the
statutory terms.32 Since most of the definitions in the Acts are fairly
specific, both state and federal courts have found it useful to use the
term investment contract as a catch-all provision to regulate novel
types of transactions that may endanger the public. The original
Howey test defining investment contract has become the primary
means for implementing the securities laws to limit economic fraud
on both federal and state levels, and has been clarified and refined
over its forty-year existence.
B. The Development of the Howey Test
The United States Supreme Court first attempted to define "in-
vestment contract" in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.3 This
case involved a public sale of oil and gas lease assignments, combined
with a promise by the seller to drill test wells on the leased land.
The Court based its decision on an analysis of the effects of the
seller's promise of test drills on potential buyers. It found that "[h]ad
the offer mailed by defendants omitted the economic inducements of
the proposed and promised exploration well, it would have been a
quite different proposition. Purchasers then would have been left to
their own devices for realizing upon their rights." ' The Court fur-
ther found that these promises contained "all the evils inherent in
28. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (italics in
original).
29. See supra note 3.
30. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
31. SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943); SEC v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588, 590 (N. D. Ga. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 497
F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1973).
32. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 344, 350-51.
33. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
34. Id. at 348.
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the securities transactions which it was the aim of the Securities Act
to end." 5 The Court did not formulate a definitive test. Rather, it
held that economic reality was a crucial factor in determining
whether the instrument in question was a security. 3 'Joiner is one of
the earliest examples of judicial willingness to broadly construe the
provisions of the Securities Act.
Three years later, in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.," the United
States Supreme Court announced a formal test for determining the
existence of an investment contract. The defendant in the case owned
tracts of citrus trees in Florida. Ownership of small parcels in these
tracts were offered to outside parties to help finance the company's
growth." The purchasers were offered an additional service contract
under which an affiliated company would cultivate and harvest the
sold tracts for the purchaser.3 9 The service contract gave the com-
pany full authority to harvest and sell the crop, with each owner
receiving a pro rata share of their contribution to the crop profits
from the entire harvest.' The Court relied on existing state securi-
ties laws to form a definition of investment contract that previously
had been unexplained in the federal statutes." The Court concluded
that an investment contract means: "(1) a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person (2) invests his money in a (3) common
enterprise and is (4) led to expect profits solely from the efforts of
the promoter or a third party."' 2 Again, the Court expressed a will-
ingness to expand this definition as necessity demanded, since it was
"a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adap-
tation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those
who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits."' 3
The test, therefore, was designed to be modified as required to
35. Id. at 349.
36. Id. at 353.
37. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
38. Id. at 295.
39. In over 85% of the sales, the service contract was purchased with the land sales
contract. The Court stressed that the investors were out-of-state tourists who had no knowl-
edge of the citrus business and were almost entirely dependent on the seller's skill for a profit.
Id. at 295.
40. Id. at 296.
41. The Court cited a Minnesota case, State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn.
52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920). The court in Gopher Tire defined an investment as the "placing of
capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employ-
ment." Id. at 56, 177 N.W. at 938. See also SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298
(1946).
42. Id. at 298-99.
43. Id. at 299.
(Vol. 29
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achieve the ends sought by the securities laws. Since it fails to cover
various situations in which an informed investment decision is essen-
tial, there are fundamental problems with the test in this form. Nev-
ertheless, the Howey test proved to be effective in reaching many ex-
otic types of investments.44
Howey and Joiner, taken together, indicate an expansive ap-
proach to defining an investment contract. The rather rigid and for-
mulaic test advanced in Howey, however, eventually demonstrated a
need for modification. 5 In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. For-
man,46 the United States Supreme Court finally acknowledged the
need to reinterpret the Howey test. In Forman, persons interested in
becoming tenants in a low-income housing co-op were required to
buy shares in the management company that owned the building. 47
Although the instruments were referred to as "stock," the Court rea-
soned that the purchaser's expectations were not sufficiently financial
in nature since they only wanted housing, 4  and that any expected
"profits" did not result from the managerial efforts of the issuer. 9
The case in effect modified the Howey test to also require an expec-
tation of financial return and that the issuer's efforts be primarily
"entrepreneurial or managerial."50 Forman also signalled a willing-
ness of the Court to stress the "economic reality" of the transaction,
44. See Carney & Fraser, supra note 18.
45. In the years following Howey, lower federal and state courts were forced to change
the test to reach fair results.
46. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
47. Id. at 842.
48. Id. at 851.
49. Id. at 854.
50. Id. at 852. The Court in Forman stated:
The Court of Appeals also found support for its concept of profits in the fact
that Co-op City offered space at a cost substantially below the going rental
charges for comparable housing. Again, this is an inappropriate theory of "prof-
its" that we cannot accept. The low rent derives from the substantial financial
subsidies provided by the State of New York. This benefit cannot be liquidated
into cash; nor does it result from the managerial efforts of others. In a real
sense, it no more embodies the attributes of income or profits than do welfare
benefits, food stamps, or other government subsidies.
The final source of profit relied on by the Court of Appeals was the possi-
bility of net income derived from the leasing by Co-op City of commercial facili-
ties, professional offices and parking spaces .. . .The income, if any, from
these conveniences . . . is to be used to reduce tenant rental costs . . . .[T]his
income . . . is far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire transac-
tion within the Securities Acts.
Id. at 855-56. See also FitzGibbon, What Is A Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility
To Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893, 902 (1980).
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whether or not an investment contract was involved.5 In other
words, securities law would only apply if a court felt that regulation
was necessary.
The Howey test soon proved too limited in scope to cover all
transactions in which the public was at risk. Courts began to expand
the Howey elements in order to cover an increasing array of invest-
ment opportunities. One of the first elements to be expanded was the
requirement of a "common enterprise" between the investor and the
seller. 2 The concept was defined and expanded in cases subsequent
to Howey. The common enterprise test examines the financial rela-
tionship between the investor/buyer and the promoter/seller in the
transaction." This element is designed to exclude purely commercial
transactions from the securities laws by requiring that the considera-
tion for the transaction is somehow merged, not exchanged. 4 The
character of the link is crucial to a finding that the requisite com-
monality exists. The explosive growth in this area has caused a for-
mulation of two differing forms of common enterprise. Courts are
split, however, as to the type of commonality required to satisfy
Howey.55
The two types of commonality developed by the court are verti-
cal and horizontal. Vertical commonality refers to the linked fortunes
of investor and promoter. 6 Horizontal commonality requires a pool-
51. Carney & Fraser, supra note 18.
52. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). See infra notes 137-40 for
an analysis of this requirement.
53. The traditional or vertical common enterprise approach is defined as one "in which
the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of
those seeking the investment or of third parties." SEC v. Glenn Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d
476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). The central concept is whether the
investors future profits depend on the success of the enterprise of which the transaction is a
part.
54. See infra notes 118-29 and accompanying text. This requirement assumes a great
significance in commodity trading account cases, where courts have analyzed the degree of
commingling of broker and investor funds. See also SEC v. International Mining Exch., Inc.,
515 F. Supp. 1062, 1067 (D. Colo. 1981) (a broker-client relationship satisfies commonality if
broker uses money pooled from other investors).
55. Vertical commonality has been accepted in the fifth, eighth, ninth and tenth circuits.
See, e.g., Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974); Turner, 474
F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973); International Mining Exch., 515 F. Supp. 1062 (D. Colo. 1981);
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973), rev'd and remanded,
497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974). Horizontal commonality, on the other hand, is found only in the
sixth and seventh circuit. See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
56. See SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 758 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1985).
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ing of investors' money with other investors. 7 This type of common-
ality is apparently limited to cases involving discretionary brokerage
accounts, especially in the commodity futures market. Courts have
been reluctant to apply securities laws to situations involving com-
modities, noting that specialized legislation already covers that
subject.58
The fourth element of the Howey test, requiring that profits be
expected solely from the efforts of others, also required change.59
Under the original formulation of the Howey test, any participation,
however minimal, on the part of the buyer precluded the finding of
an investment contract. This had the effect of completely excluding
from securities law regulation pyramid schemes: transactions in
which an investor only receives a return from subsequent investors. 0
The case of SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.6" reme-
died this nagging problem. Turner involved a pyramid scheme in
which a person invested in a self-improvement course and was then
induced to sell the program to others, thereby receiving a bonus for
each recruitment. Thus, the investor could also be characterized as a
promoter since he directly participated in the formation of future
profits from his own investment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals noted the narrow scope of the original Howey test and ruled
that the "efforts of others" need only be significant and essential.62
The court concluded that the policy considerations of protecting the
public from dubious money making schemes warranted the broader
57. Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 278.
58. See Commodities Exchange Act of 1934 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26
(1988)).
59. 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
60. A pyramid scheme is when the investor receives a return not from the profits accru-
ing from the enterprise but rather from the investments of subsequent investors. The few in-
vestors at the "top" of the pyramid have a good chance of realizing a return on their invest-
ment. On the other hand, those in the chronologically bottom layers of the pyramid will seldom
realize any profit. Pyramid schemes are dependent on a investor inducing others to follow. See
Long, infra note 74.
61. 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Or. 1972), affd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
62. The court in Turner stated:
It would be easy to evade (the Securities Laws) by adding a requirement that
the buyer contribute a modicum of effort. Thus the fact that the investors here
were required to exert some efforts if a return were to be achieved should not
automatically preclude a finding that the Plan or Adventure is an investment
contract. To do so would not serve the purpose of the legislation. Rather we
adopt a more realistic test, whether the efforts made by those other than the
investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.
Id. at 482.
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application of the test."8 This decision was successful in extending
the potential criminal liability of securities fraud to pyramid
schemes. However, other types of investments still remained outside
the reach of the securities laws and confusion developed as to the
scope of the definition of investment contract.
The case of Noa v. Key Futures, Inc." indicated that the courts
were no longer willing to expand the definition of investment con-
tracts. In Noa, the defendants offered investors a chance to buy silver
bars as an investment, and would buy the silver back at the inves-
tor's option at any time at the then current market price.65 The court
decided that this arrangement was not a security under Turner, rea-
soning that the seller had no impact upon the success or failure of
the investment.66 Instead, the market price for silver would be the
determining factor.67 The court felt that the commonality require-
ment was not met because the person soliciting the investment had
no impact on the market at large. Because it is one of the only cases
not to hold that a questionable transaction is a security, Noa indi-
cates possible limits to the further expansion of the definition of in-
vestment contracts.
In SEC v. International Mining Exchange, Inc.,e8 the court
was confronted with determining whether the sale of concessions in a
mining operation was essentially an investment contract under
Howey. Investors initially contributed toward the development of the
mine, which allegedly qualified under a federal tax deduction con-
cerning natural resource development.69 The defendants then issued
options to investors on the gold not yet extracted. The court rejected
the defendant's contentions that the case fit under Forman because
the investor's expected profit was not monetary in nature, but was
rather a tax benefit.70 Instead, the court found the options consti-
tuted an investment contract, since the investors had placed money in
control of the promoter in anticipation of future return. The Inter-
national Mining Exchange court applied an expansive view of the
Howey test.
63. But see SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding
that a pyramid scheme was not a security).
64. 638 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1980).
65. Id. at 79.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 79.
68. 515 F. Supp. 1062 (D. Colo. 1981).
69. See I.R.C. § 616 (1987) (allowing deductions up to five times the investor's cash
outlay).
70. International Mining Exch., 515 F. Supp. at 1068.
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Other decisions clearly demonstrate the need for courts to ex-
pand the definition of a security through the use of the Howey test.
SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co.7" involved a purchase agreement
for gold ore that would be produced using a new extraction tech-
nique developed by the sellers. The company in Goldfield had pub-
licly traded stock, but nevertheless attempted to finance a new opera-
tion through the ore purchase program." Buyers would pay for the
ore mining and refinement while the sellers were responsible for
processing, refining, and storing the gold. The court found that the
25% royalty fee for the use of the new processing technique devel-
oped by defendants and the speculative nature of the technique itself
was risky enough to bring the transaction within the scope of the
securities law.78 The royalty fee arrangement satisfied the common
enterprise element. Likewise, the Howey test requiring profits from
the promoter's efforts was met because any return on investment de-
pended on the success of the extraction technique.
As these prior decisions demonstrate, although many courts
have found it necessary to modify the elements of the Howey test, it
remains effective in reaching most cases of investor fraud and is still
the federal test used to determine the presence of an investment con-
tract. The Howey test is also used successfully at the state level. State
securities regulation is premised on slightly different policies than
federal securities law. This has forced state courts and legislatures to
alter or supplement the Howey test in order to effectuate the state
policy behind securities regulation. One such state is California.
C. California: The Howey and Risk Capital Tests
State securities laws serve a more direct role in attempting to
control investor fraud than the federal statutes. Where the federal
laws are directed towards the national market and large corporations
with access to it, state securities laws are designed to protect its resi-
dents from smaller and riskier enterprises.74 State regulation of se-
curities, known as "Blue Sky Laws,"' ' 7 antedated the federal Acts of
71. 758 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1985).
72. Id. at 461.
73. The court stated that, "a common enterprise exists if a direct correlation has been
established between success or failure of Goldfield's efforts and success or failure of the invest-
ment." Id. at 463.
74. Long, State Securities Regulation-An Overview, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 541 (1979).
75. State securities statutes were known as Blue Sky Laws after the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917). In Hall, the Court
referred to the schemes that the state laws attempted to restrict as having no more substance
than so many feet of blue sky. Long, supra note 74, at 542.
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1933 and 1934 and were in effect "the first consumer protection stat-
utes."7 Prior to the federal acts, it was the state legislatures that
attempted to keep pace with rapidly evolving financial markets by
constantly expanding the scope of the laws." Once the Securities Act
of 1933 was passed, many states used it as a model in revising their
own securities laws." States, therefore, have a great interest in devis-
ing a comprehensive regulatory scheme to protect their residents
from economic fraud.
The California Corporate Securities Act is closely patterned af-
ter the federal Securities Act of 1933. 7' Like its federal counterpart,
the California statute has a large definitional section.80 Other sec-
tions provide for disclosure and registration of every security offered
to the public unless specifically exempted.8' The legislative purpose
of the Corporate Securities Act is "to protect the public against
spurious schemes, however ingeniously devised, to attract risk capi-
tal." 2 The transaction in question must come within the regulatory
purpose of the securities laws."8 Another aim of the Corporate Se-
curities Act is to afford the state some control over the types of in-
vestments or securities offered to the general public.84 As in the fed-
eral system, the means of regulating questionable transactions is
accomplished primarily through the definition of an investment
contract.
The Howey test is used extensively in California to enforce the
antifraud provisions of the Corporate Securities Act. One example is
People v. Park,85 in which the defendant convinced two elderly
women to invest money in a condominium building project. Their
investment was misappropriated by the defendant and the project
was never completed." The trial court decided that the women had
76. Long, supra note 74, at 543.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. People v. Schock, 152 Cal. App. 3d 379, 387, 199 Cal. Rptr. 327, 331 (1984), See
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25805 (Deering 1979).
80. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25022 (Deering 1979). See also supra note 2.
81. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110 makes it illegal to offer securities that are unqualified
under §§ 25111, 25112, 25113 or not exempted under § 25100.
82. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 814, 361 P.2d 906, 907, 13
Cal. Rptr. 186, 187 (1961).
83. Sarmento v. Arbax Packing Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 421, 424, 41 Cal. Rptr. 869,
870-71 (1964).
84. Hayden Plan Co. v. J. M. Friedlander, 97 Cal. App. 12, 16, 275 P. 253, 255
(1929).
85. 87 Cal. App. 3d 550, 151 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1978).
86. Id. at 559, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
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become partners with the defendant, absolving him of liability for
securities fraud.87 In overturning the lower court's decision, the
Court of Appeal applied the Howey test and found an investment
contract since the women's sole contribution was money and that any
return depended on defendant's efforts.88 Since the women had pro-
vided the money to build the condominium, the common enterprise
element was met. Defendant was thus found guilty of securities
fraud.
Tomei v. Fairline Feeding Corp.89 was a California case simi-
lar to Howey. Tomei involved a program in which an investor could
buy cattle from a feed operation. The feeding company offered to
provide care facilities for the animals, like the orange trees in Howey,
that were essential to the investment and not really an option for the
average investor.9" The court found that the investors were entitled
to the disclosure and protective provisions of the California securities
laws.
California courts, however, found that the Howey test could not
completely effectuate the public policy of protecting investors since
the test is limited to situations in which the investor expects a finan-
cial gain as a return on the investment. This limitation effectively
excluded a large number of investment schemes from coverage of the
securities laws. In order to include such schemes, the California Su-
preme Court formulated a "risk capital" test in the case of Silver
Hills Country Club v. Sobieski."
This case involved the formation of a country club relying on
membership sales for the capital needed to construct the facilities.
Under the Howey test, there would have been no sale of securities
since what was offered was only a right to use a service and there
was no expectation of financial gain. The Court rejected this analy-
sis, noting that the sellers were
soliciting the risk capital with which to develop a business for
profit. The purchaser's risk is not lessened merely because the
interest he purchases is labelled a membership. Only because he
risks his capital along with other purchasers can there be any
chance that the benefits of club membership will materialize.92
87. Partnership offerings are exempted from securities registration under CAL. CORP.
CODE § 25102(0. See infra note 92.
88. Park, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 563, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
89. 67 Cal. App. 3d 394, 137 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1977).
90. Id. at 399, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
91. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
92. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
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Therefore, the court announced a new test to determine the existence
of an investment contract. The elements of the test include: (1) funds
solicited for a business venture or enterprise; (2) random solicitation
of the funds; (3) passive investors, those powerless to affect the suc-
cess of the venture; and (4) funds substantially "at risk."98 Where
the Howey test focuses on the relationship between investor and pro-
moter, the risk capital test measures the degree of risk inherent in an
investment scheme. The perspective of the risk capital test enables
courts to bring many more schemes under the securities laws. Thus,
as a means of enforcing the legislative intent behind the securities
laws, California courts use both the risk capital test and the Howey
test alternatively to define an investment contract.94
Subsequent use of the risk capital test by California courts dem-
onstrates the usefulness of the new test in reaching transactions the
Howey test could not. In Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corpo-
rations,95 the public was offered unmounted diamonds for sale with
an option to return the diamonds after three years for the price paid
plus 5% interest. The court adopted a narrow definition of "risk cap-
ital" and concluded that since the diamonds were already offered at
fair market value, purchaser's funds were not at risk." The court
decided that, if a transaction was adequately secured by the seller,
the investor's money was not at risk, thus negating any need to pro-
tect investors through coverage of the securities statutes. In dicta, the
Hamilton Jewelers court indicated that non-secured and under-
93. Id.
94. The court in Silver Hills stated:
It bears noting that the act extends even to transactions where capital is placed
without expectation of any material benefits. Thus from its exemption of securi-
ties of certain nonprofit companies the act specifically excepts "notes, bonds,
debentures, or other evidence of indebtedness, whether interest-bearing or not.
"Since the act does not make profit to the supplier of capital the test of what is a
security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is to afford those who risk
their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in legitimate ven-
tures whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one form or an-
other. Hence the act is as clearly applicable to the sale of promotional member-
ships in the present case as it would be had the purchasers expected their return
in some such familiar form as dividends. Properly so, for otherwise it could too
easily be vitiated by inventive substitutes for conventional means of raising risk
capital.
Id. at 815-16, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188. See also People v. Figueroa, 41 Cal.
3d 714, 715 P.2d 680, 224 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1986).
95. 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1974).
96. Id. at 336, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390. "[Tlhe purchase price advertised in connection
with the warranty ($500) was no greater than the value of the diamond which would serve, in
effect, as security for the refund of the purchase price if the customer sought reimbursement."
Id.
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secured transactions may constitute a sufficient degree of risk to war-
rant protection of potential investors.9 Therefore, an approach that
closely follows the concept of risk is useful, but incomplete. Although
it protects the public from some spurious transactions, it fails to fo-
cus on the investor's need for information and is thus limited to situ-
ations in which the transaction itself bears an undue amount of risk.
Later decisions further explored the potential of the risk capital
test. One case, People v. Schock,98 extended the scope of the risk
capital test to promissory notes. Fractional interests in promissory
notes were offered by a mortgage loan brokerage company. The
court applied the risk capital test and found that the arrangement
was a security since the notes themselves were unsecured, placing the
monies paid "at risk."" Schock, like Silver Hills, marked the move-
ment of state securities regulation beyond the limits of federal securi-
ties regulation. Under the Howey test, it is difficult to find an invest-
ment contract in promissory note transactions, since the nature of the
transaction resists application of the Howey test elements. Therefore,
federal courts have usually held that promissory notes are not securi-
ties, while state courts using the risk capital test have increasingly
applied it to cases involving these types of transactions.100
In Leyva v. Superior Court,10' California courts further ex-
tended the scope of the California Corporate Securities Act to assign-
ments of fractional interests in promissory notes secured by deeds of
trust. Although courts only apply the Act to transactions containing
promissory notes when certain criteria are met, the defendants sold
fractionalized interests in one trust deed to over 200 people. 0 It is
important to note that in cases in which the transaction is somehow
secured, the Howey test, rather than the risk capital test, will usually
determine the existence of an investment contract.103 However, it is
the state courts, not the federal courts, that have used both tests in
97. Id. at 336, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91.
98. 152 Cal. App. 3d 379, 199 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1984).
99. The court in Schock noted, "The Corporate Securities Act is designed to regulate the
transactions by which promoters go to the public for risk capital." Id. at 386, 199 Cal. Rptr. at
330 (citing People v. Walberg, 263 Cal. App. 2d 286, 69 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968)).
100. Long, supra note 74, at 546.
101. 164 Cal. App. 3d 462, 210 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1985).
102. Id. at 474, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 552. "[I)t plainly was not the legislative intent that
"every" note or evidence of indebtedness, regardless of its nature and of the circumstances
surrounding its execution, should be considered as included within the meaning and purpose of
the act." People v. Davenport, 13 Cal.2d 681, 686, 91 P.2d 892, 895 (1939). However, selling
or assigning notes or interests to more than ten persons will trigger the application of the
securities laws under CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 260.105.30(e)(1) (1984).
103. See Long, supra note 74.
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expanding the purview of the securities laws.
The possibilities of broader application of the risk capital test
soon extended into other areas. The case of People v. Graham0"
held limited partnerships to be a security under the risk capital test
in certain situations. Traditionally, limited partnerships are exempt
from the California securities laws as long as they are not offered to
the public indiscriminately.'0 5 Graham established the application of
the risk capital test to any, non-exempt limited partnership transac-
tion. In determining whether a transaction is a public offering in the
context of partnership or venture, the numbef of people to which the
offering is made may not exceed twenty five and a maximum of only
ten may accept the offer.' 06 A "preexisting relationship" test and a
"sophisticated investor" test are also required to exempt the transac-
tion.'" In this way, the court tests the necessity that a prospective
investor be protected from what may prove to be a dubious invest-
ment scheme in a partnership context. Therefore, the tests required
to apply the limited partnerships exemption further the policy aims
of the California securities laws by drawing a distinction between
the usual limited partnership and an exotic investment scheme con-
taining one.
The facts of People v. Stewart"" provide a clear example of the
complexity of today's financial transactions, which are confusing
even to sophisticated investors. The defendant, who held an interest
in a mining supply business that leased equipment and services to
already developed mines, entered into a joint venture with others to
start a mining company. The defendant was required to supply only
the necessary start-up capital while the other partners were respon-
sible for management. The other partners eventually left, leaving de-
104. 163 Cal. App. 3d 1159, 210 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1985) (following People v. Woodson,
78 Cal. App. 2d 132, 177 P.2d 586 (1947)).
105. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(f) (Deering Supp. 1989) states:
The following transactions are exempted from the provisions of section 25110:
(0 Any offer or sale, in a transaction not involving any public offering, of any
bona fide general partnership, joint venture or a limited partnership interest
Id. See also CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 260.102.2 (1987).
106. 163 Cal. App. 3d at 1170, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
107. A preexisting relationship exists when the parties to the transaction know each
other sufficiently to "enable a reasonably prudent purchaser to be aware of the character,
business acumen, and general business and financial circumstances of the person with whom
the relationship exists." 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CAL. SECURITIES
LAWS § 4.02A(2)(c)(ii) (1983). The sophisticated investor test evaluates the business judgment
of the investor. Id. at § 4.02A(c)(iii).
108. 182 Cal. App. 3d 222, 227 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1986) (not officially published per
order of the California Supreme Court).
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fendant and the supply company with sole equity in the mine. In
order to raise money, the defendant used a technique called "factor-
ing" in which he would buy accounts receivable from other compa-
nies at a discount and resell them to investors for a higher
amount.' O9
The defendant represented to various financial planners that he
held paper in the form of accounts receivable from major corpora-
tions, due in thirty days, and would secure their value by guarantee-
ing a redemption for twenty-one days after the initial thirty days had
expired."' The planners then involved clients in the mining com-
pany, but the clients received paper only from the mining company,
not from the major corporations."' The security for the paper was
provided by the mining company itself, which had no equity and
eventually filed for bankruptcy.
The investors lost all of their investment, after having received
worthless paper from a bankrupt company. The court decided that
the sale of paper to the public was a security based on the finding
that the accounts receivable issued were a "sham."' 1 2 Furthermore,
there was also inadequate security given for the paper, since the
mines were running at a loss and there was nothing to ensure that
the mines would ever produce."'
The preceding cases demonstrate only a portion of the myriad
of investment opportunities offered to the public. In most cases, ap-
plication of either the Howey or risk capital tests have brought the
transactions within the purview of the securities laws and limited the
investing public's exposure of the public to questionable financial
schemes. Unfortunately, as stated before, new and more complex op-
portunities for investment continue to appear. However, the recent
trend has been to contract rather than expand the protection of these
doctrines. Several recent cases seem to permit transactions that en-
danger the public. These cases should have required the application
of the disclosure and antifraud provisions of state and federal securi-
ties laws, but they did not.
109. For example, .many companies who need quick assets are willing to sell their re-
ceivables for 92 cents on the dollar. The purchaser then resells for 96 cents and pockets the
difference. In short term speculation, the factoring is generally given a maximum of 30 days
maturity. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 279.
112. Id. at 282.
113. Id. at 283.
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D. The Current State of Securities Law
Two recent cases, one from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the other a California appellate court case, depict the present trend
toward restricting the application of the securities laws to novel in-
vestment schemes. These cases have created increasing confusion in
both state and federal courts.
The first case is SEC v. Belmont Reid & Co., Inc."' There, the
Ninth Circuit first signalled an intent to retreat from vigorous appli-
cation of protective securities regulation. In order to raise capital to
develop what was thought to be gold-bearing property, the defendant
corporation offered investors the opportunity to purchase gold coins
that would be minted from the expected future gold production. The
transaction was in effect a futures contract, but the money solicited
was to be used to produce the coins themselves."" The mines were
found to have no gold, and bankruptcy proceedings soon were initi-
ated against defendants. In holding that the transaction was not a
security, the court stated,
This case is a close one. It is clear that the issue before us is
whether . . . [the] profits come "solely" from the, efforts of
others. [I]t is easy to assert that the failure or success of the
enterprise in which the prepayment purchaser was engaged de-
pended significantly on the managerial efforts of [defendant]."'
After noting that the common enterprise requirement of Howey was
met, the court refused to judge the transaction a security because of
dangers that any sale of goods, whether commercial in nature or not,
would conceivably come within the scope of the securities acts.""7 By
departing from the precedent established by the earlier Howey line of
cases, Belmont Reid initiated a backward trend in the growth of se-
curities regulation.
The reluctance to further expand the scope of the securities law
soon appeared in state decisions as well. The California case of
114. 794 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1986).
115. In a futures contract, a party promises to either make a delivery or take delivery of
a commodity or item at an agreed price and time. They are traditionally used to give value to
goods that do not yet exist. For example, a farmer can "lock-in" a particular price for an
unharvested crop already given a market value. The farmer thus speculates that the market
price will not rise before delivery. If the market price rises, the farmer will be forced to sell at
the lower contract price. However, if the market price drops, the farmer will get the higher
contract price in excess of what the prevailing spot cash market price is at the time. See gener-
ally Chicago Board of Trade, Commodity Trading Manual (1985).
116. 794 F.2d at 1391.
117. Id.
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Moreland v. Department of Corporations"' is one of the most re-
cent. The defendant advertised the sale of already mined and
processed ore to raise capital for a new processing plant.' 9 In addi-
tion to the sales contract, buyers could enter into a second contract
under which the defendant would refine the ore and then deliver it
to another company to certify the gold purity. A third contract se-
cured the defendant's performance under the first two contracts by
the assets of the company. The court refused to hold the transaction
a security, despite a close factual resemblance to Goldfield. The
court based its decision on Belmont Reid, noting that the buyer kept
almost full control over his purchase regardless of the series of con-
tracts entered into. Essentially, the court felt that unless a greater
degree of commonality was present, the sales and refinement agree-
ments could not properly be called securities. Turning to the risk
capital test, the court found that the transaction was adequately se-
cured under Hamilton Jewelers since the ore sold had some gold
content.
A case factually similar to Moreland, but which reached a dif-
ferent result, is Hentzner v. State.'12 The defendant in this case was
pre-selling gold below the market price in order to raise the capital
to mine what he had already sold. The Alaska Supreme Court took
a different view than the Moreland court, finding all the elements of
the Howey test, and concluding that the transaction was an invest-
ment contract. Rejecting the argument that there was no common
enterprise, the court stated that "the money received from investors
was to be pooled in order to buy mining equipment and supplies so
that Hentzner could mine the gold he was contracting to sell."''
The court also found the reliance on the efforts of others require-
ment, noting that "[s]ince the investors were in a position of continu-
ing dependency on Hentzner's efforts to extract gold from the
ground, the efforts of others test was satisfied."' These cases illus-
trate the split among states as to the ultimate aims of the securities
laws and contrast the results between a jurisdiction which aggres-
sively expands the definition of a security and one that has stopped
expanding the definition.
118. 194 Cal. App. 3d 506, 239 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1987).
119. Present processing techniques cannot remove all of the ore. Dump ore may retain
up to a 25% or greater gold content after an initial processing depending on the efficiency of
the processing technique.
120. 613 P.2d 821 (Alaska 1980).
121. Id. at 824.
122. Id.
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In addition to modifying the Howey test and risk capital tests,
some states have simply fused the two. This new test was first an-
nounced in State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc. 2 ' This test retains
the main points from both the Howey and risk capital tests. Many
states quickly adopted this test to determine investment contracts for
their securities laws, since the use of two co-existing tests has led to
confusion."24
III. ANALYSIS
Both state and federal securities laws, as the preceding section
has illustrated, are not concerned with controlling every speculative
transaction. Securities laws instead attempt to regulate situations in
which a promoter solicits funds from an investor for capital only and
the investor has no function beyond supplying the capital.125 One
example is where an investor plays an active role in the venture,
such as in a partnership. Securities laws are likewise not concerned
with the person who buys a passive asset in anticipation of an in-
crease in value.12 Instead, there must be some type of shared enter-
prise in which the investor contributes money to a promoter in re-
turn for a future benefit. This shared enterprise concept is the basic
purpose underlying stocks, bonds, and other traditional forms of
securities.
Many capital raising transactions, however, cannot be easily
classified as a security. Besides the more obvious types of securities
such as stocks and bonds, securities laws also mention, but do not
define, the term investment contract. 12 7 It is this catch-all concept
which courts have interpreted to extend coverage of the securities
laws to transactions which cannot be characterized as a more tradi-
tional form of security, but nevertheless require regulation.
Securities law is an area in which there is a large amount of
diverse case law which has limited use as precedent. Because of the
constant efforts of issuers to structure transactions to be outside the
123. 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (Haw. 1971).
124. See, e.g., Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 552 S.W.2d 4 (Ark.
1977); State v. George, 50 Ohio App. 2d 397, 362 N.E.2d 1223 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975); Pratt v.
Kross, 276 Or. 483, 555 P.2d 765 (Or. 1976).
125. Long, supra note 74.
126. For example, buying a parcel of land anticipating that its value will rise in the
future is a personal investment. However, it is not considered an investment under the securi-
ties laws since there is no outside party soliciting capital in order to realize the increase in
value. See, e.g., Long, supra note 74.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (Deer-
ing 1979). See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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current state of securities law, the cases are valuable only to the ex-
tent that the precedent can be easily extended to following cases. The
courts are necessarily forced to react to new transactions on a case by
case basis, drawing distinctions between those schemes which require
investor protection and those schemes that are purely commercial
transactions. By emphasizing the policy aims of the securities laws
over a rigid and formal application of the black letter rules, courts
will generally be more successful in properly defining what is a se-
curity. Defining an investment contract requires not only applying
either the Howey or risk capital tests, but also recognizing the larger
context of securities regulation.
Securities law is concerned only with transactions where there
is an enterprise in which the investor plays a passive role while leav-
ing active management to the party to whom the capital is given.
Both the Howey test and the risk capital test reflect this. For exam-
ple, the two Howey test requirements of common enterprise and ben-
efit from the efforts of someone other than the investor prevents the
test from being applied to purely commercial transactions. If the in-
vestor simply buys undeveloped land, the transaction is entirely pas-
sive and there is no common enterprise."' On the other hand, if the
investor is active in the investment in a significant way the "efforts of
others" element is not met. The Howey element of common enter-
prise means that both parties pool resources to achieve a common
goal. In a commercial transaction, the only enterprise common to all
parties is the transaction itself, since each party gains a benefit on
nearly equal terms. The securities laws are thus confined to situa-
tions where the investor's role is simply to supply capital for others
to manage." 9 This situation is where the need for investor informa-
tion is at its greatest.
Furthermore, there is also a difference between state and fed-
eral interests in the ends sought by the securities laws. On the fed-
eral level, the laws attempt to regulate and watch over the national
securities markets, where state interest is mainly oriented towards
protection of individual investors.'3 0 A further complication arises as
the SEC today does not appear to have the resources to enforce the
securities laws against isolated transactions. Therefore, the number
of federal investment contract cases brought by the SEC appears to
128. Long, supra note 74, at 564. See also J. LONG, BLUE SKY LAW § 2.03(2)(b)
(1986). See generally L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 489 (2d ed. 1961).
129. Long refers to this as a separation of the capital supplying function from the oper-
ational of managerial function. See generally Long, supra note 74.
130. Long, supra note 74, at 547.
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be declining.1"1 This vacuum will have to be filled by the states,
which have a more direct involvement with protecting its residents.
Most state securities laws are comprehensive enough to compensate
for a decline in federal enforcement. There is a danger for a state
court to rely too heavily on federal securities decisions, since the pol-
icy aims of the two are different. "' The result of this differing policy
will be inconsistent decisions regarding similar types of transactions
between state and federal courts. "' State enforcement, therefore,
must be more stringent than federal in order to effectuate a protec-
tive policy rather than a regulatory one merely requiring disclosure.
There is a final but crucial difference between the concepts of
federal and state securities regulation. The federal system is predi-
cated only on the premise of full disclosure."3 As long as all material
facts are given to the investor, the antifraud provisions of the securi-
ties acts do not apply, regardless of the nature of the scheme itself.
Under no circumstances may the SEC refuse to register the security
if there is full disclosure. The investor is entitled only to complete
information, not qualitative protection."' Many states, including
California, go much further than the federal laws and apply a con-
cept of merit regulation, where a security may be deemed too dan-
gerous for a public offering and refused registration by the appropri-
ate agency.' 36
Since the purpose of securities law is to protect the public, the
definition of a security should be expanded to cover transactions re-
garding certain sales of commodities to give speculators the legal pro-
tection they do not have otherwise. 3 7 Futhermore, state interest in
enforcing its securities laws is increasing as the federal government
reduces its role of investor protection."' The unsophisticated inves-
tor, often blinded by the lure of quick and easy profits, will usually
bargain from a position of weakness since the information on which
the investor relies can easily be manipulated or omitted by the pro-
131. See Long, supra note 74. Due to increasingly limited resources, in addition to
changes in Administration policy, the SEC is refusing to prosecute individual cases along the
lines of Howey.
132. Long, supra note 74, at 547. Long states that although prior federal decisions are
useful in state courts, the state policy in many cases may be contrary to the federal cases.
133. See generally Long, supra note 74, at 546.
134. Long, supra note 74, at 548.
135. Long, supra note 74, at 548.
136. See generally Long, supra note 74.
137. See THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1934 AND SECURI-
TIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973) for the complete legislative history of the Federal Secur-
ities Acts.
138. Long, supra note 74, at 545.
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moter. The securities laws offer the most logical solution to the prob-
lem of economic fraud because they are designed to give the investor
both adequate information and legal redress in cases of fraudulent
misrepresentation. Indeed, many securities laws are in effect con-
sumer protection statutes.1 "9 Although certain securities will be ex-
empted by statute from registration, the antifraud provisions of se-
curities laws are always available to the public. The laws list specific
instruments as securities, such as stocks and bonds, but also mention
nebulous terms like "investment contracts." 14 It is the definition of
these terms to which the courts have extended securities laws to
schemes which do not involve the more obvious types of securities
investments such as stocks or bonds but nevertheless merit investor
pr'tection. A court decision which holds a particular transaction not
to be a security in effect endorses the use of the scheme to raise
capital. Therefore, courts must necessarily avoid an inflexible appli-
cation of the tests used in finding an investment contract.
The Noa case illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing the type
of transaction which merits securities law coverage from purely com-
mercial ones. Since defendants had no influence over the value of the
bars after purchase, the transaction was indisputably commercial in
character. But this is also true for stock and bond investments.
Transactions which contain both commercial and investment aspects
require careful scrutiny. The court in Noa apparently overlooked the
fact that it is not the object of the transaction which needs to be
regulated but the transaction itself. Extending the securities law to
this type of transaction would not burden speculative selling of pre-
cious metals. It would instead afford protection against fraud based
on the circumstances underlying the manner of the transaction itself.
If the deal is fair and the promoters are merely acting as brokers,
then the securities law is unnecessary regarding that sale. It is when
there is unequal bargaining power between the investor and the pro-
moter, and the value of the object of the transaction cannot be deter-
mined by an external factor, that the public needs protection from
exotic investment opportunities. Courts are well equipped to decide
questions of fairness. Recently, however, fear of encroachment into
commercial activities has led to inflexibility.
Examples of this inflexibility are found in both Belmont Reid
and Moreland. The courts in these cases seemed overly concerned
with rigidly applying both the Howey and risk capital tests to the
139. Long, supra note 74, at 543.
140. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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facts and, in general, ignored the protective policy behind securities
law. Both cases replaced this policy with a concern for judicial over-
reaching. This fear is unnecessary, especially considering holdings
from earlier cases with nearly identical facts situations. A transaction
which contains both commercial and investment elements must be
evaluated in light of the policy behind the securities laws.
For example, the trial court in Belmont Reid applied the Howey
test and found that there was no common enterprise between inves-
tors and the mining company and that the expected profits would
come from price moves in the world gold market, not the managerial
efforts of the promoters. 41 The court of appeal focused solely on the
managerial efforts argument in affirming the trial court. 4" The
court of appeal further stated that the Howey test was satisfied but
refused to reverse the decision, fearing that the scope of the securities
laws would extend too far. 4" This decision may be a result of the
diverging goals of securities regulation between state and federal
courts.
To reach its decision, the court in Belmont Reid ignored the
reality of the transaction in that the money solicited and invested was
to be used to produce the object of the transaction itself. Without the
invested money, the gold could not be produced and the coins could
not be minted. In all previous cases, a direct connection between in-
vested money and its intended use was sufficient to meet the common
enterprise requirement of Howey. The use of the invested capital to
produce the object of the investment further distinguishes Belmont
Reid from Noa,"'" where the object of the transaction already ex-
isted, making the transaction purely commercial. Since the sale of the
metals in Noa came from inventory, the value of the silver was influ-
enced only by fluctuations in the world market and not by defend-
ant's affirmative act.' 4 5
In addition to the reasons above, the Belmont Reid court also
141. 794 F.2d 1388, 1390 (9th Cir. 1986). See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying
text.
142. Id. at 1390.
143. The court in Belmont Reid stated:
The difficulty we have with this analysis is its ready applicability to any sale-of-
goods contract in which the buyer pays in advance of delivery and the ability of
the seller to perform is dependent, in part, on both his managerial skill and
some good fortune. Perhaps the SEC views such contracts as covered by Howey.
If so, we must express our doubts.
Id. at 1391.
144. 638 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1980).
145. Id. at 80.
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relied heavily on the case of Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc.,' 46 in which the sale of sugar futures contracts
was held not to satisfy the investment contract test. This case dealt
only with the sale of the contract to a buyer who wished to speculate
on sugar prices. In a purely commercial transaction the investor is
simply buying something which the solicitor possesses and, most im-
portantly, over which the seller has no influence on value. In cases
where an investor opens a discretionary trading account with a solic-
itor, the scenario changes. Now the investor has placed money with
one whose actions will have an impact on the value of the expected
return for the investor.
Belmont Reid seems even more incongruous when compared
with Goldfield. The only factual difference between the two cases is
that the defendants in Goldfield touted a new technique in gold rec-
lamation from dump ore, whereas Belmont Reid involved only stan-
dard processing to produce the gold. In both cases, investors placed
money with defendants so that gold could eventually be produced
with the solicited capital. It was the efforts of the defendants, revolu-
tionary technology or not, which could produce the gold necessary to
complete the transaction. Over three million dollars solicited from
investors in Belmont Reid was lost when the corporation went bank-
rupt.14 No coins were ever issued. It is apparent that the investor's
desire to speculate on the price of gold was an inducement to the
initial investment, as was the fact that the coins were sold at a dis-
count.' 4 The courts must be careful to distinguish between the often
separate motivations of both parties in entering the transaction. This
will help provide a determination of whether the investor is merely
supplying capital for the promoters use or simply exchanging money
for goods and services.
The Moreland decision suffers from many of the same difficul-
ties as Belmont-Reid. This case has a great degree of similarity to
Howey. The optional refining and security agreements are in their
practical effects virtually identical to the facts of Howey. In Howey,
the citrus groves were offered to people who had no expertise in
cultivation. This made the option of choosing the additional service
agreements a sham. In reality there was no option, for the investor
was forced to depend on the defendants to care for the investment
itself. The fact that a "choice" was given to the investor does not
146. 253 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
147. 794 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1986).
148. The coins were priced from 33% to 48% below the current spot cash price of gold.
Id. at 1389.
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abrogate the need for investor protection.
An illusory choice was also apparent in Moreland, where the
investor had the option of just buying the ore, in which case there
would not have been an investment contract. Most investors, how-
ever, lacked the ability to transport the ore themselves to the refinery
of their choice. The defendants in Moreland stipulated in the trial
court that the nearest refinery which investors could use was located
in El Paso Texas, almost two thousand miles away. Most investors,
therefore, would choose the "optional" agreements which bring the
entire transaction within the scope of the securities laws. The use of
all three agreements would place the investor in a sufficiently passive
role to satisfy the Howey test.
The decision in Moreland espoused an extremely narrow view
of the Howey test's second element requiring a common enterprise.
The court based its reasoning on the Goldfield case, noting that the
defendants in that case were entitled to a royalty fee for processing
the gold and further retained control over the investor's ore. There is
an additional commonality present in that the money paid for the ore
would construct a refinery to process it. After Moreland, investment
contracts require the promoters to somehow share directly in the in-
vestor's profits in order to satisfy the common enterprise element of
Howey. This view of common enterprise nearly eliminates the possi-
bility of finding the necessary interrelationship between seller's ef-
forts and the success of buyer's investment to establish a common
enterprise. Lastly, the fact that the defendants in Moreland in-
creased the value of the investment would also prove the existence of
a common enterprise.14
The Moreland court also concluded that since the marketing
and control of the refined product was in the hands of the investor,
there could be no reliance on the efforts of others and thus the fourth
element of the Howey test was not met. This interpretation com-
pletely disregards the fact that it is the efforts of processing and re-
fining by defendants, which converted the ore into gold for the inves-
tor's benefit. As in the common enterprise element, a correlation
between the seller's actions and the eventual success of the investor's
purchase establishes the investor's reliance on others.
Turning to a risk capital analysis, the Moreland court felt that
the investor's funds were not substantially at risk enough to merit
149. It is interesting to note that the sales agreement in Moreland specified that any
gold over a certain percentage would be kept by the defendants. This serves the same purpose
as the royalty fee used in Goldfield. Thus a common enterprise was present even using the
stricter approach.
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application of the securities laws through the risk capital test. The
court decided that the guarantee agreement offered by the defendants
adequately secured the transaction. However, this view of risk capi-
tal may be too restrictive. The adequacy of the secured transaction is
necessarily subjective. Thus the courts must decide to what degree of
risk the investor's money should be subject to before an investment
contract is found.
Justice Traynor's opinion in Silver Hills provides some expla-
nation. Although the Silver Hills case concerned initial capital, the
logic serves as a useful guide in later cases. Any reasoning used to
find risk capital is necessarily circular, since all investment capital
may be considered "at risk." Therefore, the question becomes one of
degree. One answer in finding a high enough degree of risk may be
to consider risk capital as invested money with a less than fair
chance of return. 50 As Justice Traynor stated in Silver Hills the
"objective is to afford those who risk their capital at least a fair
chance of realizing their objectives . ". ,,."" However, the concept
of a fair chance of return remains elusive, since the courts would
then determine a venture's chance of success in determining fair
chance. The better approach would be to measure the amount of risk
by determining the investor's need for information and the risk in-
volved if the information is faulty. A secured transaction should not
be removed from the scope of the risk capital test since the security
itself may be dubious, rendering the guarantee worthless. 52
The Moreland court relied upon the Hamilton Jewelers case
for its analysis of the adequacy of the security in the context of the
risk capital test. In Hamilton Jewelers, investors had bought
diamonds with a value outside the contract arrangement. This would
be adequate security because the investor is assured nearly a com-
plete return on the investment by selling the diamonds. Moreland is
quite different in that the security was a physical asset which had
unknown value. As there is no ready market to value the dump ore,
the investors security was substantially at risk. Courts, therefore,
must analyze the extent to which an alleged investment contract is
secured to decide the degree of risk involved.
The major problem with the decisions in Belmont Reid and
Moreland is that they expose the public to a growing amount of
150. This suggestion may be found in Note, Franchise Regulation under the Califor-
nia Securities Law, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 140, 152-54 (1968).
151. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 815, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188-89 (1961).
152. Obvious investment instruments such as stocks and bonds are secured and while
this makes them less risky, they are not risk-free.
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dubious investment offerings. The unsophisticated public is always
targeted, in part, because those who invest in the more traditional
capital markets possess a sufficient degree of knowledge to render
these markets unavailable to promoters who favor exotic schemes.'
The economic loss to society as a whole as well as the individual
makes vigorous enforcement of the securities laws essential. Investor
confidence, once lost, is difficult to revive. The purpose behind secur-
ities law is to protect the public from unscrupulous promoters. It
appears that recent decisions bode ill for that goal and may fore-
shadow an increasingly laissez-faire approach in the future.
IV. PROPOSAL
Both federal and state courts must endeavor to protect the pub-
lic by regulating the offers and sales of dangerous investment
schemes. In doing so, the courts should always look to public policy
before applying the black letter tests. Although both the Howey and
risk capital tests are fairly effective in reaching most types of
schemes, both fail to focus on the investor's need for information
before the investment decision is made. By expanding the definitions
of a security, The public is capable of obtaining information about
the prospective investment. Courts will focus more easily on this
need for information, if they evaluate an investment contract from a
public policy standpoint. Applying a black letter test without recog-
nition of the underlying legal principles will lead to more decisions
along the lines of Belmont Reid and Moreland.
California courts should also adopt the modified investment
contract test formulated in State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.,""
which combined the best elements of both the risk capital and the
Howey tests. The elements are: (1) an offeree furnishes initial value
to an offeror; (2) a portion of this initial value is subject to the risks
of the enterprise; (3) the furnishings of the initial value is induced by
the offeror's promises or representations which give rise to a reason-
able understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and
above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the
operation of the enterprise; and (4) the offeree does not receive the
right to exercise practical and actual control over the managerial de-
cisions of the enterprise.' This test, broadly applied, should prove
effective in advancing the protective aims behind the securities law.
153. See Carney & Fraser, supra note 18, at 505.
154. 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
155. Id. at 649, 485 P.2d at 109.
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Any test used by the courts must be applied with due concern
for the policy aims behind the securities laws. In achieving this end,
the courts should attempt to evaluate the investor's need for informa-
tion and protection. This perspective has been historically successful
in regulating transactions traditionally outside securities law. Both
Belmont Reid and Moreland represent an abandonment of this ap-
proach in favor of a more caveat emptor ideal. As responsibility for
individual protection of investors shifts to the states, decisions must
reflect a return to a more activist methodology to protect investors.
The modified test applied with sound regard for the protective policy
behind the securities laws will give the courts and the enforcement
agencies a comprehensive tool for reducing investor fraud.
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial enforcement of the securities laws has been generally
effective over the previous fifty years. This effectiveness is directly
attributable to the willingness of the courts to advance the public
policy underlying the securities laws. This willingness was expressed
in a constant expansion of the definition of investment contract to
cover novel investment schemes. As consumer protection increasingly
becomes a primary aim of state securities law enforcement, the need
for courts to maintain pace with exotic transactions increases also.
Once the resolve to keep pace with a rapidly expanding financial
market weakens, the public will be inundated with various deals
promising quick wealth.
It has been observed that though the schemes which the securi-
ties laws attempt to control have not really changed, their complexity
has increased. Although the courts have kept up with this change
admirably, some recent confusion has arisen as to the court's proper
role in enforcing the securities laws. This confusion is easily reme-
died by a firm adherence to the principles behind the laws them-
selves. Any transaction which receives approval by the courts will
invite an explosive growth of more potentially harmful investment
opportunities. The honest businessman will usually obtain financing
from the more traditional capital markets. The exotic and easy meth-
ods of raising capital attract a more questionable type of business-
man. If potentially dangerous investment schemes are allowed to
proliferate unchecked, it is the public alone who stands to lose. So
long as the courts emphasize the policy behind the securities laws by
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determining the need for investor protection, the public will be well
insulated from these schemes.
Richard S. Hardy
